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Insu¢cient monitoring by depositors, and thus a lack of market
discipline, are often seen as a typical feature of banks. We show that
the opposite may be the case. Banks, de…ned as …rms that borrow
from a large number of partially uninformed investors, have a tendency
to be excessively monitored by informed investors. This is shown
in a model of intermediation in which heterogenous investors choose
whether they want to monitor the intermediary or not. We also …nd
that bank …nance is preferable to non-bank …nance when assets are
relatively safe or opaque. The model which is set in a banking context
may be applicable to a wider range of information problems.
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11 Introduction
The stability of banks hinges on adequate supervision, either by the market,
or by a special authority. A failure of the market, i.e. of potential or actual
depositors, to monitor banks may create a need for bank regulation (see
Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). The dominant view among economists is
that banks are indeed insu¢ciently monitored. It is argued that banks are
typically …nanced by a large number of relatively small and unsophisticated
depositors. To such depositors, the costs of monitoring a bank are likely to
exceed any possible (private) returns. Prominent advocates of this view are
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994):
“Bank debt is primarily held by small depositors. Such depositors
are most often unsophisticated, in that they are unable to under-
stand the intricacies of balance and o¤-balance sheet activities.
More fundamentally the thousands or hundreds of thousands of
customers of a bank have little individual incentive to perform
the various monitoring functions. This free-riding gives rise to a
need for private or public representatives of depositors. We call
this the representation hypothesis.” (p. 31f., their emphasis)
Similarly Freixas and Rochet (1997) state that:
“Contrarily to non…nancial …rms, the debt of which is held in ma-
jority by ‘professional investors’ (i.e. banks, venture capitalists,
or ‘informed’ private investors), the debt of banks (and insurance
companies) is held in large part by uninformed, dispersed small
agents (mostly households) who are not in a position to monitor
banks’ activities.” (p. 264)
Lack of market discipline is thus a characteristic of banking per se, and
it explains why banks need supervision.1 Measures like deposit insurance,
despite their merits,2 may be dangerous, as they may further undermine mar-
ket discipline (see, e.g., Greenbaum and Thakor, 1995; Freixas and Rochet,
1997).
1According to Dewatripont and Tirole this is the only robust argument in favour of
banking regulation.
2Most importantly a lower probability of bank runs, see Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
2The prevailing “monitoring de…cit” view highlights important aspects of
…nancial intermediation like the public good nature of information and the
danger of moral hazard. Nevertheless, to our view, it is incomplete, as it
overlooks other important aspects of …nancial intermediation. One such as-
pect is the in‡uence of the intermediary’s choice of deposit contracts on
investors’ demand for information. In the present article we try to comple-
ment the common view, by analyzing endogenous monitoring of a …nancial
intermediary by investors.3 Making the demand for information endogenous
to contracts has interesting consequences. We …nd a result that is at odds
with the common view of insu¢cient monitoring: In our model banks are
excessively monitored.
Our line of argument can be summarized as follows. The main actor is
a …nancial intermediary. This intermediary can either be a bank, borrowing
from uninformed investors (see Dewatripont and Tirole, 1995) or a non-bank,
only borrowing from informed investors. Through the intermediary investors
can …nance a risky asset. There is only one type of risky asset; unlike in Di-
amond (1984), the intermediary cannot diversify risk.4 Investors thus have
an interest to collect information on the intermediary’s earnings prospects,
i.e. to monitor. In the model, they can acquire a costly private signal on
the future returns of the intermediary’s assets. We use a model in the tradi-
tion of Cukierman (1980) where investors can update prior expectations by
receiving a signal.5 We …nd that under bank intermediation the demand for
the signal is higher than in the benchmark case of a hypothetical uninterme-
diated economy in which investors can directly hold the risky asset. This is
3We are thus in line with Allen (2000) who identi…es as one research priority “to
incorporate information in a fully endogeneous way into microeconomic theory” (p. 148).
A recent example for the importance of endogenous monitoring cost is given in Xu (2000).
4The bene…ts of intermediation are thus given and limited. But even if perfect diversi-
…cation were possible, as in Diamond (1984), it might not be optimal for the intermediary.
Intermediaries do not fully diversify in the presence of a …xed monitoring cost per project
or per entrepreneur …nanced (Krasa and Villamil, 1992), particularly when they can choose
project size (Hellwig, 1998).
5In Cukierman (1980), the signal improves the precision of return expectations; in our
model it primarily a¤ects the level of expected returns.
In both models, information gathering occurs before contracts are made. Another family
of models builds upon post-contractual information acquisition. Such models normally
focus on the liquidation decision (see e.g. Calomiris and Kahn, 1991) and on renegotiation
possibilities (see e.g. Park 2000).
3what we call excess monitoring.6
While this result contrasts with the common view, our model also pre-
dicts some features of …nancial intermediation that seem more standard. We
…nd that relatively safe or informationally opaque assets tend to be …nanced
by banks. Further, banks issue debt-like instruments while non-bank inter-
mediaries issue instruments that are a mix between debt and equity.
We also …nd a result that may have a wider range of applications. To
present our argument, we distinguish between projects that are only worth-
while if some good news arrives (called entry-games) and projects that are
worthwhile unless bad news arrives (exit-games). A bank deposit is an exit-
game (as it is attractive to uninformed investors), while lending to a non-bank
is an entry-game. Analyzing such games we …nd that the value of information
increases in potential returns in entry-games and decreases in exit-games. It
is highest in games that a priori just about break even. This may e.g. explain
why investors do not seem to care about the probability of a currency crisis
when a country is either in very poor or in extremely good shape, but much
so when it is in an intermediate condition.
The article is structured as follows: In section 2 we propose a simple
example providing some intuition for the main result of this article. In sec-
tion 3 we model a non-intermediated economy as a benchmark against which
we will measure the outcome from an intermediated economy to be analyzed
in section 4. In section 5 we compare monitoring and investment levels in
the two economies. Section 6 concludes.
2 Entry versus exit: an example
The following example is meant to illustrate the functioning of our model
economy. Neil considers going on a camping trip.7 As most campers, he
dislikes rain. He values a dry trip at one dollar and a wet trip at minus one
dollar. Staying home has a value of zero. Sunshine and rain have probability
0:5 each. Neil is thus indi¤erent between going and staying.8 Fortunately,
before he leaves, he can call a weather service to get a forecast. The voice
on the service tape will say “good” or “bad”. “Good” means that chances
of rain are revised down to 0:25; “bad” means they are up to 0:75. For
6Under non-bank intermediation monitoring can be insu¢cient or excessive.
7The choice of a camping trip as an example is an hommage to Wallace (1988).
8We assume that when indi¤erent he takes the trip.
4consistency with prior and posterior weather probabilities, both forecasts
must have probability 0:5. Neil’s situation is illustrated by the decision tree
in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 about here]
How much would risk neutral Neil be ready to pay for the forecast? The
di¤erence in utility between being informed and uninformed is easy to com-
pute. Informed Neil goes camping after hearing “good”. (This occurs with
probability 0.5 and has expected utility of half a dollar.) He stays home
after hearing “bad” (with utility zero). Uninformed he is indi¤erent (both
alternatives having expected utility zero). The forecast (utility with forecast
minus utility without) is thus worth one quarter.9
To make Neil’s problem a bit more interesting, let us assume that his
utility from a trip is slightly modi…ed. Beer on the campground may be less
or more expensive than normal. For simplicity he always has a drink on a
dry trip, but never on a wet trip. His utility from a dry trip is now 1 + ²,
with ² ? 0 (beer cheap or expensive). We assume that ², in absolute terms,
is su¢ciently small not to make the weather forecast irrelevant.10 Neil knows
² in advance.
Informed Neil still goes for the trip after a good forecast and stays home
after a bad one. Uninformed Neil will go for the trip when ² ¸ 0 and stay
home when ² < 0: We could also say that, if ² < 0, Neil decides not to make
the trip, but would want to enter late in case of a good weather forecast.
Conversely, if ² ¸ 0, he would enroll for the trip but would want to exit in
case of a bad weather forecast. We will thus formulate two de…nitions for
later use.
De…nition 1 The game represented in Figure 1 is
² an entry-game if ² < 0,
² an exit-game if ² ¸ 0.
We found the value of the weather forecast (when beer has no in‡uence,








20 ¡ 0 = 1
4.
10It is su¢cient that ¡2
3 < ² < 2 to exclude the two trivial cases in which Neil ignores
the weather forecast.
5value? The value of the weather forecast (the value of the option to enter
late or exit early) now depends on ², i.e. on whether the trip is an entry-
or an exit-game. We denote the values of entry by V²¡ and of exit by V²+,














², where ² ¸ 0. (2)
Note that both values, V²¡ andV²+, are less thanone quarter, as the last terms
in (1) and (2) are both negative. This means that the value of information
has its maximum at ² = 0, where uninformed Neil would be indi¤erent.
How does V react to a small increase in the price of beer, i.e. to a decrease













A deduction from an agent’s return (here: a higher price of beer) thus de-
creases the value of information in an entry-game (the entry option becomes
less valuable) and increases it in an exit-game (exit becomes more valuable).
This rule is important in what follows, as we will apply it to bank deposits,
rather than to camping trips. A bank deposit is an exit-game (it is attractive
to uninformed agents). As (4) shows, the value of information on whether the
depositor will get a dry or a wet trip, so to say, increases when the promised
return on deposits decreases. This inverse relationship between the face value
of a bank deposit and the value of information to depositors will provide the
basis for the main result of this paper.
3 The non-intermediated economy
In the following sections we present our argument more formally. First, we
develop the model and analyze a non-intermediated economy to serve as a
benchmark for the intermediated case.
63.1 The model
The economy has two investment vehicles. The …rst is a (perfectly divisible)
risky asset with a publicly observable per dollar return of ~ y 2 fY;0g. Second,
there is a (perfectly divisible) safe asset that per dollar yields R (0 < R < Y ).
The risky asset’s prior probabilities of “success” (Y ) and of “failure” (0)
are p > 0:5 and (1 ¡ p), respectively. However, before money has to be
invested, a (costly) signal ¾ 2 fg;bg becomes available. The signal, which
is the same for all agents who get it, updates the odds of success and of
failure. After a good signal, g, the chances of success are q > p and those of
failure (1 ¡ q) < (1 ¡ p). After a bad signal, b, the odds are reversed.11 The
probabilities of receiving the signal g or b, henceforth u and (1 ¡ u), follow
from the prior and posterior probabilities p and q and are12
u =
q + p ¡ 1
2q ¡ 1




There is a continuum of investors, who are completely identi…ed by their
individual “type”, i.e. by their individual cost s of observing the signal. The
(deadweight) signal expenditure s is made in non-…nancial form (e.g. as an





.13 Investors are risk-neutral and in the aggregate they
have one dollar to invest.14
We identify the level of monitoring with the fraction k (0 < k < 1) of
investors who decide to acquire the signal. A fraction 1 ¡ k decide to get
no signal; we will call their state of information n. Investors cannot com-
municate; their state of information (g, n, b) as well as their investment
11The signal tells the investor from which of two lotteries ~ y is drawn. The two lotteries
correspond to the camping trip with a good, and a bad weather forecast, respectively
in the example given above. The probabilities q and (1 ¡ q) can be interpreted as the
probabilities that the signal, as a forecast of success or failure, will be right, or wrong,
respectively. A signal with the same structure is used in Dow & Rossiensky (1998).
12The solutions for u and 1 ¡ u in the text follow from the condition for consistency
p = uq + (1 ¡ u)(1 ¡ q).
13Individual di¤erences in s can have several reasons in practice. The per-dollar cost
of monitoring may fall with the size of an investment, with its duration, and with the
sohistication of the investor, see Jackson and Kronman (1979).
14In Birchler (2000) a benchmark case of this model is used in which the project’s
expected return after a bad signal is equal to R, but where failure pay-o¤ may be positive,
allowing separating equilibria characterized by dual class debt.
7Region Y g n b Game type
O Y < R=q no no no
A R=q · Y < R=p yes no no entry-game
B R=p · Y < R=(1 ¡ q) yes yes no exit-game
C R=(1 ¡ q) · Y yes yes yes
Table 1: Investment into risky asset as a function of potential return and the
signal received
decisions are strictly private knowledge.15 Monitoring in this model thus is
the (pre-contractual) acquisition of information on returns from a particu-
lar asset (“screening”), rather than on the (post-contractual) behavior of an
intermediary. This restriction simpli…es the comparison of monitoring levels
with and without an intermediary.
The time-line of events is the following: In t = 0 investors learn about
model parameters including their (privately known) s. In t = 1 investors …rst
have to decide about getting the signal before investing either in the risky
asset or in the safe asset. In t = 2 the risky asset matures and its return
becomes known.
3.2 Investment
We solve the game backwards. Investors …rst determine how to invest in each
state of information, then on getting the signal. The optimal investment
strategy is represented in Table 1. An investor prefers the risky to the safe
asset if it has a higher (or at least the same) expected return, the expectation
being conditional on his state of knowledge. The decision to invest is a
function of the potential return of the risky asset, Y , and of the investor’s
three possible states of information. Depending on the state of knowledge,
the probability of success, i.e. of Y , can be q (signal g), p (no signal), and
1¡q (signal b). Table 1 shows in terms of these parameters, when an investor
should invest in the risky asset (“yes”) or buy the safe asset (“no”).
The table shows that, when Y is in region O, a rational investor never
invests in the risky asset. With Y in region C, he always does. In both cases
15This assumption is made to isolate the model from any external e¤ects of individual
information. It is less unrealistic than it may seem, as in practice information is not only
costly to transfer, but also not necessarily credible.
8he disregards any signal. We will not deal with these trivial cases. The two
interesting cases are the ones with Y in either region A or B. In region A
the investor prefers the risky asset only after a good signal; the risky asset is
an entry-game in the sense of De…nition 1, above. In region B the investor
prefers the risky asset unless he has bad news; here the risky asset is an
exit-game.
3.3 Monitoring
A rational investor will buy the signal if its value is bigger than or equal
to its cost. If the value of the signal to investors is V , all investors with
information cost s · V buy the signal. Therefore, the fraction of monitoring
investors is
k = V=S: (6)
To solve k we have to know the value of the signal, V . This value depends
on the investment strategy summarized in Table 1. In region A the signal is
only relevant if good. Conversely, in region B the signal is only relevant if
it is bad. In both cases, its value is equal to the probability that the signal
is relevant (u in region A, and (1 ¡ u) in region B), multiplied by the net
expected return from acting according to the signal (getting qY instead of R
in region A, and R instead of (1 ¡ q)Y in region B). The values of the signal
in the two regions, denoted by VA and VB, are thus
VA = u[qY ¡ R], (7)
VB = (1 ¡ u)[R ¡ (1 ¡ q)Y ], (8)
the di¤erence in the V 0s being due to a di¤erent investment behavior of
uninformed investors. Note that both, VA and VB, decrease in p and increase
in q. In other words, uncertainty (lower p) makes the signal more valuable,
and so does a higher information content (higher q).16
Figure 2 illustrates the fraction of informed investors in the non-inter-
mediated equilibrium, k, as a function of Y . The function k(Y ) is roof-
shaped: The value of information, V , rises with Y in region A (where the
risky asset is an entry-game) and falls with Y in region B (where the risky
asset is an exit-game). The value of information, V , and thus the fraction
of monitors, k, are highest around Y = R=p: For low and high values of Y







9(Y = R=q +® or Y = R=(1¡q)¡®, with small ®), investment mistakes are
not very expensive. At Y = R=q + ® an uninformed investor misses a small
opportunity by not investing, although the signal would have been good.
At Y = R=(1 ¡ q) ¡ ® the expected loss from blindly investing, although
the signal is bad, is small as well. In both cases, the signal can be ignored
without severe consequences. In contrast, in the middle range of Y (around
Y = R=p) ignorance is most expensive. Here, the expected return foregone by
a wrong investment decision is relatively large. As can be seen in Figure 2, at
Y = R=p, the fractions of monitoring investors, kA = VA=S and kB = VB=S,




R ´ (1 ¡ u)
(q + p ¡ 1)
p
R = VB. (9)
We have assumed that 0 < k < 1, i.e. that neither the set of informed nor
the set of uninformed investors are empty. Figure 2 makes clear what the
requirements are. For k > 0, Y must satisfy R=p < Y < R=(1 ¡ q) (as
mins = 0 ). For k < 1, the peak of k at R=p must be below unity. According





For what follows we assume that (10) holds.
The roof-shape of k(Y ) or of V (Y ) may explain information demand in a
much wider range of situations. In the labor market, e.g., information on a
job opportunity (or on a candidate) is most valuable when the decision-maker
is roughly indi¤erent about accepting or declining. It is not very valuable
when an o¤er looks either poor or irresistible.17
We will use the non-intermediated economy as a benchmark for monitor-
ing levels under intermediation. A monitoring level that exceeds or falls short
of the corresponding monitoring level in the non-intermediated economy as
depicted in Figure 2 will be called excessive or de…cient.
[Figure 2 about here]
17This example has been suggested by Andréa Maechler.
104 Intermediation
4.1 The intermediary and contracts
We now examine an economy with an intermediary. In such an economy
investors do not have direct access to the risky asset; they can only lend to
the intermediary or invest in the safe asset. The intermediary is a monopolist
and owns the risky asset.18 She has no in‡uence on its parameters, though.
Her only role is to make the risky asset accessible to investors.
The intermediary, like investors, is risk-neutral. She has no wealth of her
own, but can …nance the risky asset by borrowing from investors. To do so,
she must o¤er contracts which she does on “take-it-or-leave-it” terms. We
assume that the intermediary has to announce contracts in period t = 0, i.e.
before investors take any decisions as to the signal and to investment. In
t = 1, after having learned about available contracts, investors decide about
getting the signal, i.e. becoming monitors. The intermediary gets the signal
for free. Still in t = 1, investors can accept a contract or buy the safe asset.
We will call an investor who accepts a contract a “depositor”.19 The number
of depositors is not publicly observable, nor is the intermediary’s investment
decision. In fact, the intermediary invests all the funds she gets in the risky
asset.20 In t = 2 she receives the return from the risky asset and shares it
with depositors according to contracts.
The choice of contracts in this simple economy is very limited. Con-
tractual payments can only depend on veri…able states of nature. The only
such states are success and failure of the risky asset. The signal, the state
of knowledge of individual investors or their lending decisions have been as-
sumed to be private knowledge.21 Furthermore, limited liability prevents
contractual payments in case of failure. Therefore, contracts can only have
one argument, the promised payment in case of success. We will denote this
payment by D.
In the presence of an intermediary there are three decisions to be taken:
First, the intermediary o¤ers contracts that maximize her pro…ts. Then,
18The assumption of a monopoly simpli…es the analysis. For our qualitative results,
some market power of the intermediary would su¢ce.
19Investors who are indi¤erent are assumed to choose the alternative preferred by the
intermediary.
20We will prove this in the Appendix.
21We have assumed that investment decisions are not observable to investors; contracts
therefore cannot be written on the fraction of investors who become depositors.
11D g n b Contract type Game type
R=q · D < R=p yes no no monitoring contract entry-game
R=p · D < R=(1 ¡ q) yes yes no banking contract exit-game
Table 2: The depositing decision as a function of the promisedpayment and
the signal received
investors decide about the signal. Finally, they choose between accepting
a contract (making a deposit) and buying the safe asset. Again, optimal
decisions are found by backwards induction, i.e. in the order: depositing,
monitoring, and choice of optimal contracts.
4.2 Depositing
In the presence of an intermediary, investors do not decide about investment,
but onlyabout depositing. The investment decision(riskyversus safe asset) is
taken by the intermediary. Due to her limited liability, she always puts all the
funds she manages to raise into the risky asset, even after a bad signal.22 The
investors’ problem is thus very similar to the one in the non-intermediated
economy. The only di¤erence is that the return to investors when the risky
asset succeeds is now D instead of Y . The optimal depositing strategy is
summarized in Table 2.23 The two relevant regions di¤er with respect to the
behavior of uninformed investors. We call a contract with R=q · D < R=p
a “monitoring contract”. Such a contract is only attractive to successful
monitors, i.e. to investors with a good signal (who attach probability q to
success). The monitoring contract, in our terminology, is an entry-game.
In contrast, a contract with R=p · D < R=(1 ¡ q) is called a “banking
contract”. It is not only attractive to investors with good news, but also
to uninformed investors (to whom success has probability p). A banking
contract is an exit-game. The interpretation of a bank as a …rm that borrows
from uninformed depositors follows Dewatripont and Tirole (1994, p. 32).
22The intermediary cannot commit herself to an investment strategy. After a bad signal
she thus either gets no deposits (if uninformed investors do not deposit). Or, she has to pay
depositors an expected income of at least R (to attract uninformed depositors). Therefore
her pro…t from buying the safe asset after a bad signal would be zero. In contrast, betting
on the risky asset yields positive pro…t with a probability of (1 ¡ q) .
23We ignore the two trivial cases in which investors, irrespective of their state of knowl-
edge, never make a deposit (D < R=q) or where they always do (R=(1 ¡ q) · D).
124.3 Monitoring
The value of the signal follow from investment strategies. By analogy to
signal values in regions A and B in the non-intermediated economy, signal
values under a monitoring contract and under a banking contract, Vm and
Vb, are
Vm = u[qD ¡ R], (11)
Vb = (1 ¡ u)[R ¡ (1 ¡ q)D]. (12)
If the monitoring contract were always o¤ered in region A and the banking
contract in region B, comparison of monitoring levels would be straightfor-
ward. As D · Y , Vm · VA and Vb ¸ VB, there would be too little monitoring
under the monitoring contract and too much under the banking contract.
Yet, this is not the case. As we will show below, the simple rule “monitoring
contract in region A, banking contract in region B” does not hold. Before
judging monitoring levels we thus …rst have to …nd which contract is o¤ered
for the di¤erent admissible values of Y .
4.4 The optimal contract
Under decentralized decision making aggregate revenue is maximized in the
non-intermediated equilibrium discussed above in Section 3. The interme-
diary could implement this equilibrium by o¤ering investors the contract
D = Y .24 Yet, this would wipe out, rather than maximize her pro…t. The
(privately) optimal contract maximizes the intermediary’s expected pro…t,
under the assumption that investors follow rational information and invest-
ment strategies. It is found in two steps. First, we derive both, the optimal
monitoring contract and the optimal banking contract, separately. Then, we
compare pro…ts from each contract to see which contract is o¤ered under
what circumstances.
4.4.1 The optimal monitoring contract
Under a monitoring contract, the intermediary has km(Dm) depositors after a
good signal (probability u), and no depositors after a bad signal. The fraction
24This would be the equilibrium if all bargaining power were with investors, rather than
with the intermediary.
13of monitoring investors, km, is an increasing function of Dm as the monitoring




¦m = km (Dm)uq[Y ¡ Dm] (13)







u[qDm ¡ R], (14)
qDm ¡ R ¸ 0, (15)
R ¡ pDm ¸ 0, (16)
Y ¡ Dm ¸ 0, (17)
Dm ¸ 0. (18)
These are the optimal information constraint (14) (in which Dm has a posi-
tive sign), the participation constraint for investors with a good signal (who
attach probability q to success) (15), a non-participation constraint for unin-
formed investors (16), plus limited liability of the intermediary (17) as well
as of investors (18).25
The intermediary’s problem has the following solution:
Proposition 2 (The monitoring contract). The intermediary o¤ers a
uniform contract with pay-o¤ Dm in case of success, leading to a fraction of








u[qY ¡ R]. (20)
Proof. The solution for Dm follows from the only F.O.C.: qY +R¡2qDm =
0. None of the constraints (15) to (18) bind. Constraint (18) cannot bind
without violating (15). Neither of (17) or (15) can bind, as both would imply
zero pro…t. Substituting the solution for Dm into (14) yields the solution for
km.
25Constraint (16) can be ignored. It only binds at values of Y ¸ (2q ¡1)R=pq at which
the monitoring contract is not o¤ered, as we will show below.
14Under the monitoring contract, as (19) shows, the expected return to
depositors, qDm, is the average of expected returns on the risky asset (qY )
and the safe asset (R). The monitoring contract thus implements some pro…t
sharing between the intermediary and depositors. This makes it a combina-
tion of debt and equity similar to …nancial contracts often found in venture
capital …nance.
4.4.2 The optimal banking contract
Under a banking contract the intermediary gets money from all investors
after a good signal (probability u), and from fraction (1 ¡ kb (Db)) investors
after a bad signal (probability (1 ¡ u)). Fraction kb is a decreasing function
of (Db), as the banking contract is an exit-game. Depending on the signal,
success has probability q or (1 ¡ q). The intermediary thus solves
max
Db
¦b = uq[Y ¡ Db] + (1 ¡ kb (Db))(1 ¡ u)(1 ¡ q)[Y ¡ Db], (21)







(1 ¡ u)[R ¡ (1 ¡ q)Db], (22)
pDb ¡ R ¸ 0, (23)
qDb ¡ R ¸ 0, (24)
R ¡ (1 ¡ q)Db ¸ 0, (25)
Y ¡ Db ¸ 0, (26)
Db ¸ 0. (27)
Note that in the information constraint (22) Db has a negative sign. There
are three participation constraints, one for each of the two groups of investors
who accept the contract plus a non-participation constraint for investors with
a bad signal.26 Wealth constraints are identical to those under the monitoring
contract.
The intermediary’s problem has the following solution:
Proposition 3 (The banking contract). The optimal banking contract
has pay-o¤ Db in case of success, leading to a fraction of kb informed in-














Proof. Participation constraint (23) binds: The intermediary must pay at
least Db = R=p to attract uninformed investors. Higher Db would mean lower
pro…ts, as the direct negative e¤ect on pro…t from higher Db is stronger than
the indirect e¤ect via lower kb, i.e. @¦b=@Db
¯ ¯
Db>R=p < 0, as follows from
(22), (21), and from (1 ¡ u)(q + p ¡ 1) = u(q ¡ p). The latter equation is
also used to solve for kb after substituting R=p for Db in (22).
Under the banking contract the intermediary maximizes pro…ts by set-
ting the margin per depositor as high as possible (pay Db = R=p) at the
cost of having a smaller fraction expected depositors (more investors who
get the potentially bad signal) than at higher levels of Db. She sets unin-
formed investors to their participation constraint (23). As a consequence, the
promised return on the banking contract Db, unlike Dm, is independent of
the potential return on the bank’s asset, Y , a feature that reminds of debt.27
27We …nally prove that the intermediary does not hold the riskfree asset. We show that
the fraction of her funds invested in the riskfree asset, ½ ( 0 · ½ · 1), has an optimum
value ½¤ = 0.
By holding the safe asset the intermediary could pay depositors ½R in case of failure,
permitting her to pay only Db (½) = [1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)½]R=p in case of success. This would
reduce the fraction of informed investors to






R = (1 ¡ ½)kb (0).
However, the direct loss from investing in the safe, rather than in the risky asset, exceeds
the indirect gains from lower kb. Rewriting (21) by use of optimal payments to depositors
(Db (½) and ½R ) as well as by weighting pro…ts with (1 ¡ ½) , taking derivatives, and
rearranging by use of @kb (½)=@½ = ¡kb (½)=(1 ¡ ½) yields the F.O.C.
kb (½¤) =
p
2(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ u)
.
The right hand side is bigger than unity, as follows from p ¸ 0:5 > 1 ¡ q and from (5).
Further, (10), kb (½¤) > 1, and S ¸ u(q ¡ p)R=p imply a negative solution for ½¤. But
negative ½ is not economically feasible (the intermediary cannot borrow at the riskfree
rate), hence ½¤ = 0 .
164.5 Contract regions
We have derived the optimal monitoring contract (19) and the optimal bank-
ing contract (28). Among both, the intermediary chooses the one that max-
imizes her expected pro…t. We thus compare pro…ts from the two rival
contracts. Pro…ts under the two optimal contracts (found by substituting





2 [qY ¡ R]
2 , (30)











The critical value of Y , at which the banking and the monitoring contract
break even, called ^ Y , is the solution to a quadratic equation in ^ Y which has
one economically relevant solution.28 It can be shown that for any admissible
values of parameters R, S, p, and q, the critical value ^ Y lies in a particular
interval corresponding to the left part of region B in Figure 2:
Lemma 4 The border-line between the monitoring and the banking contract,











Proof. The lower bound: If Y = R=p, ¦b = 0 and ¦m > 0.
The upper bound: Assume that at Y 0 = (2q ¡ p)R=qp, ¦m > ¦b . Setting
Y = Y 0 in (30) and in (31), using ¦m > ¦b and rearranging yields S <
u(q ¡ p)R=p, which contradicts assumption (10).
The two boundary values for ^ Y are the closest values for which pro…ts
from both contracts can unambiguously be compared without knowledge of
28Setting
a = u2q2=4S, and d = u(1 ¡ u)(q ¡ p)(1 ¡ q)R=p2S,
the solutions are
^ Y1;2 =
[p(1 ¡ d) + 2a=q] §
p
p(1 ¡ d)[p(1 ¡ d) + 4a=q]
2a[(1 ¡ d) + a=q2]R
.
As all coe¢cients, including (1 ¡ d), are positive, it is easy to show (by comparing squared
expressions) that the numerator must be positive even when the negative sign of the square
root applies. Therefore ^ Y1;2 > 0. The larger solution can be shown to violate (16); it is
thus not economically relevant.
17the actual values of R, S, p, and q. At the lower bound, expected pro…t from
the monitoring contract is positive, while pro…t from the banking contract is
zero. At the upper bound, deposit returns and monitoring levels under both
contracts are identical (Dm = Db and km = kb), but the banking contract
always attracts more depositors (the uninformed) and thus generates higher
pro…ts. Between the two boundary values, the monitoring or the banking
contract can be more pro…table, depending on model parameter values.
Inspection of (30) and (31) reveals the in‡uence of di¤erent parameters
on the choice of contracts. First, higher information costs favor the banking
contract: With increasing S , ¦m diminishes while ¦b increases. Second, an
increase in p ceteris paribus favors the banking contract. Both e¤ects tell the
same story: A less risky asset (higher p) or a less reliable signal (lower q) work
in the same direction as higher information costs; they make information of a
certain quality less useful or more expensive and thus increase the pro…tabil-
ity of the banking contract. Banks are often said to …nance “opaque” assets.
Opaqueness, in the language of this model, is either high S (information ex-
pensive) or small excess of q over p (information unreliable). In fact, opaque
assets in this interpretation tend to be …nanced through banking contracts,
rather than through monitoring contracts.
5 Comparison of monitoring levels
Having derived optimal contracts we can now compare monitoring levels
with intermediation and without. In Figure 3 solid lines represent monitoring
levels under the monitoring contract, km, and under the banking contract, kb.
Dotted lines, kA and kB, (borrowed from Figure 2) stand for monitoring levels
in the non-intermediated equilibrium, when Y is in regions A (Y < R=p) and
B (Y ¸ R=p), respectively.
The monitoring contract is always o¤ered when Y < R=p and sometimes
when Y ¸ R=p. In the …rst case it unambiguously leads to a monitoring
de…cit (km < kA). In the second case it may lead to de…cient monitoring
(km < kB) or to excess monitoring (km > kB), depending on whether ^ Y lies
to the left or to the right of the intersection of km and kB. In contrast, the
banking contract is never o¤ered when Y < R=p (in region A), as follows
from Lemma (4). This allows us to state our main result in the form the
following proposition:
18IY g IY b k
non-intermediated equ.
– region A kA 0 kA = 1
Su[qY ¡ R]
– region B 1 1 ¡ kB kB = 1
S (1 ¡ u)[R ¡ (1 ¡ q)Y ]
intermediated equ.





– banking contract 1 1 ¡ kb kb = 1
S (1 ¡ u)
q+p¡1
p R
Table 3: Investment into risky asset and monitoring levels in di¤erent equi-
libria
Proposition 5 (Excess monitoring under the banking contract.) The
banking contract leads to excess monitoring, i.e. to
kb > kB.
Proof. From (32) Y < R=p; from (12), (8), and D · Y , kb > kB.
Banks, in the sense of …rms borrowing from unsophisticated and thus un-
informed investors, are excessively monitored (by a suboptimally high frac-
tion of informed investors). As noted above, the monitoring level under the
banking contract does not depend on Y , but on D. In contrast, monitoring in
the non-intermediated equilibrium in region B falls in Y . Excess monitoring,
as measured by the di¤erence kb ¡ kB, thus increases in Y and reaches its
maximum at R=(1¡q), where investors with direct access to the risky asset
would invest blindly.
[Figure 3 about here]
Resources spent on excess monitoring are not fully lost. More monitoring
does not only mean more (deadweight) signal expenditure, but also a higher
fraction of informed investors, i.e. less investment in the risky asset after
a bad signal (which has negative expected present value). Using aggregate
expected return as a social welfare criterion we show that the excess signal
expenditure nevertheless exceeds the resources saved by less investment after
a bad signal.
Proposition 6 (Welfare loss from excess monitoring.) The level of
welfare is lower under the banking contract than under the corresponding
19non-intermediated equilibrium.
Proof. Welfare levels (net of signal expenditure) in the non-intermediated
equilibrium (Region B) and under the banking contract, WB and Wb, are:




2 [R ¡ (1 ¡ q)Y ]
2 ,















As the banking contract is only o¤ered when pY > R, it follows that WB >
Wb.
This means that the expected return saved by smaller investment in the
risky asset after a bad signal does not fully compensate excessive monitor-
ing expenditure. Excess monitoring thus implies a welfare loss. More gen-
erally, welfare is lower in the intermediated equilibrium than in the non-
intermediated equilibrium.29
6 Concluding Remarks
We have shown in the context of …nancial intermediation that in models
of endogenous information it might be crucial to distinguish between assets
that are attractive to uninformed investors (like bank deposits), and assets
that are not (credits to non-banks). We found that a reduction in promised
returns diminishes investors’ demand for information in the former case, and
increases it in the latter. This …nding may have more general applications.
It may explain information demand in the job market or in international
lending, to take two examples. Yet, we think it is particularly important
29This is also true under the monitoring contract. We limit ourselves to give the lines
of proof for the two possible cases:
(1.) In region A (R=q < Y < R=p), the monitoring contract implies insu¢cient moni-
toring (km = kA=2). With the same logic used in the text for the banking contract it can
be shown that Wm < WA, as the signal expenditure saved by insu¢cient monitoring falls
short of the expected return lost through smaller investment in the project after a good
signal.
(2.) In region B (Y ¸ R=p) the monitoring contract may lead to insu¢cient or to excess
monitoring. Yet, as Wm < WA and, in this region, WA < WB, it follows that Wm < WB.
The monitoring contract implies lower welfare than the non-intermediated equilibrium in
this region as well.
20in the area of …nancial intermediation. It means that banks are excessively
monitored. Investors spend more money on information when they consider
lending to a bank than when they could directly hold the bank’s assets.
Our paper tells a story about the delegation cost of intermediation. We
found a distortion of investors’ monitoring decisions in the presence of asym-
metric information and limited liability. In the absence of perfect diversi…-
cation by the intermediary (as assumed by Diamond, 1984) and of perfect
competition between intermediaries, delegation is costly. Excess monitoring
is one form in which delegation costs occur.
The main prediction from our model, excess monitoring of banks, con-
trasts with the predominant “de…cient monitoring view” formulated by De-
watripont and Tirole (1994).30 Both models provide complementary partial
insights into endogenous monitoring of an intermediary by investors. Dewa-
tripont and Tirole (1994) focus on the public good character of information.
Our model examines the impact of intermediation on the demand for infor-
mation. Both models thus describe potentially important aspects of …nancial
intermediation.
Their empirical and policy implications di¤er from ours. Dewatripont
and Tirole expect banks to hold “low monitoring assets”. In our model,
the banking contract tends to be optimal for the intermediary if it holds a
risky asset with high a priori probability of success (high p), a weak signal
(low q), or an expensive signal (high S). Such assets are relatively safe,
but informationally “opaque”. Evidence that banks are indeed opaque is
found by Morgan (1999). While Dewatripont and Tirole do not explicitly
model intermediaries’ liability structure, our model also explains features of
contracts found in practice. The promised return on the banking contract is
independent of the potential return on the bank’s asset, reminding of debt.
In contrast, the monitoring contract is a combination of debt and equity,
reminding of venture capital …nance.
Contrary to Dewatripont and Tirole, we have assumed that information
cannot be communicated from one agent to the other. This is a strong as-
sumption. In reality, investors may have both kinds of information: (1.)
knowledge that may be di¢cult to share due to communication costs or to
credibility problems, and (2.) information that travels easily, or that bene-
…ts the uninformed through actions of the informed (e.g. through liquidating
30In reality, banks may also be insu¢ciently monitored due to (excessive) implicit or
explicit deposit insurance.
21bad banks, as in Calomiris and Kahn, 1991, or in Park, 2000). Both, the
Dewatripont and Tirole model and our own, thus explain some aspects of
intermediation. Only a model allowing for both kinds of information could
probably replicate the rich variety of existing …nancial institutions, including
banks, non-bank intermediaries, as well as rating agencies and bank super-
visors.
22Appendix
We prove that the intermediary does not hold the riskfree asset. We show
that the fraction of her funds invested in the riskfree asset, ½ ( 0 · ½ · 1),
has an optimum value ½¤ = 0.
By holding the safe asset the intermediary could pay depositors ½R in
case of failure, permitting her to pay only Db (½) = [1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)½]R=p in
case of success. This would reduce the fraction of informed investors to






R = (1 ¡ ½)kb(0).
However, the direct loss from investing in the safe, rather than in the risky
asset, exceeds the indirect gains from lower kb. Rewriting (21) by use of op-
timal payments to depositors (Db (½) and ½R ) as well as by weighting pro…ts
with (1 ¡ ½) , taking derivatives, and rearranging by use of @kb (½)=@½ =




2(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ u)
.
The right hand side is bigger than unity, as follows from p ¸ 0:5 > 1¡q and
from (5). Further, (10), kb (½¤) > 1, and S ¸ u(q ¡ p)R=p imply a negative
solution for ½¤. But negative ½ is not economically feasible (the intermediary
cannot borrow at the riskfree rate), hence ½¤ = 0 .
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Figure 3: Monitoring in the intermediated equilibrium
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